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The Mythology of the Social Impact Bond. 
A Critical Assessment from a  
Concerned Observer 
Leslie Huckfield ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Mythologie des Sozialen Wirkungskredits – eine kritische Bewer-
tung eines besorgten Beobachters«. Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) entered public 
political discourse in the UK in 2007. Many of their original claims – that they 
represent a bipartisan approach, generate public sector savings, promote inno-
vation, and transfer risk from the public sector – have little basis in evidence so 
far produced. These are “myths of SIBs.” This contribution explores four myths 
about SIBs, based on claims by SIB proponents – usually financial intermediar-
ies and potential deliverers with vested interests in their success. Recent de-
tailed evaluations and assessments show that a more cautious approach is 
needed before further expansion of SIBs and their funding takes place. Against 
considerable previous theoretical unpinning claimed by SIB proponents for 
these models, this contribution seeks to rectify serious omissions of public poli-
cy discourse, including analytical and theoretical literature, as a starting point 
for the relocation and reclamation of previous roles and territories for public 
service delivery. This article also presents detailed evidence on substantial fund-
ing from Government Departments, the UK National Lottery, and dormant bank 
accounts to support SIBs, the total of which amounts to more in subsidies for 
SIBs than the actual investment attracted from private investors. The conclu-
sion is that it may be easier and even cheaper for public administrations direct-
ly to finance social programmes. 
Keywords: Social impact investment, myths, public sector savings, financial in-
novation, evidence based policy, assessment, payment by results, transfor-
mation of social services, social impact bonds, United Kingdom. 
1. Introduction 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) represent a recent financial model for privatising 
public services, usually involving a delivery provider, external private inves-
tors, and public outcome funders. Their development and structures are usually 
promoted by a “social investment financial intermediary” – which may then 
become involved in their delivery (Warner 2013). Since 2007, SIBs have 
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grown rapidly. In January 2018, 108 contracted impact bonds across 25 coun-
tries, along with many more in design, were reported (Gustafsson Wright 
2018). More recently the UK Government Outcomes Lab databases shows that 
there were 71 UK SIBs (Blavatnik School of Government 2019), so that the 
UK accounts for half of all SIBs worldwide (Fox et al. 2017, 4).  
But during ten years of SIBs, serious misperceptions and misunderstandings 
have arisen. This contribution examines four well known claims made for SIBs 
and finds little evidence to support them.  
Firstly, some SIB advocates claim that they represent a bipartisan approach 
across political parties. But this claim is difficult to support. Rather than repre-
senting any kind of consensus across the political spectrum, most progress for 
SIBs under both Labour and Conservative Governments has been enabled 
through lack of public awareness and no political resistance. Minimal under-
standing of commissioning and procurement processes for UK public service 
delivery including social investment and SIBs has enabled their development 
below the political radar.  
Secondly, SIB proponents cultivate a widespread myth about a “growing 
SIB market,” so that on account of this latest variant of privatisation, provision 
of public services may become less reliant on public resources. Instead, as 
shown below, there is ample evidence that there are more public subsidies for 
social investment and SIBs than external funding from investors, with most 
SIBs kept alive through underpinning by a constant programme of Government 
subsidies and promotions. To demonstrate this, Appendix 2 provides a list of 
Government programmes which support and promote SIBs.  
Because significant transaction, ongoing support costs, and staff time are 
usually confidential, it is almost impossible to ascertain the real costs of most 
SIBs, whether from public or private sources. The role of intermediaries and 
evaluators, acting as SIB policy entrepreneurs and supply side drivers, is rarely 
mentioned, which overlooks their role and obscures the financial flows and real 
costs of SIBs.  
Thirdly, proponents claim that SIBs are progressed within frameworks of 
evidence based policy and generate savings and increase efficiency through 
enabling government to finance only those services which are effective. But 
evaluations so far show little evidence of savings, impact measurement, or 
transfer of risk. Even where measurement has taken place, this either lacks 
rigour or substance and often both, with few comparisons with other financing 
models for service delivery. Evaluations in Table 1 show that it may be easier 
and even cheaper for public administrations directly to finance social pro-
grammes. 
Fourthly, it is claimed that that SIBs promote innovation, with their financial 
backers supporting start-ups using venture capital. But evidence shows that 
once set up, many SIBs demonstrate little innovation in service delivery and 
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seek to increase rewards to their investors by minimising their financial expo-
sure.  
Despite little evidence to support any of these claims, it is striking that many 
SIB proponents still advance arguments they used ten years ago. In July 2018 
UK local government finance organisations jointly published a guide to alterna-
tive service delivery models, using arguments from 2008 (Robinson et al. 2008; 
Social Finance 2009). “Social impact bonds (SIBs) allow governments to try 
out new social services on a no-win, no-fee basis, bringing in non-government 
investors to provide funding and transfer risk” (CGMA and CIPFA 2018, 14). 
A recent decision tree analysis shows that recent reports (e.g., Ronicle et al. 
2014) have presented SIBs as “win, win, win” opportunities for all parties, but 
present the “benefits of SIBs against no clear comparator” (Giacomantonio 
2017, 49). A range of SIB promoters and supporters keep repeating these myths 
about the functioning of SIBs, which this contribution seeks to demystify.  
To provide insights for this contribution, the author has an extensive politi-
cal background as a Labour Member of both Westminster and European Par-
liaments and as a Government Minister throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Since 
then, until entering academia, he specialised in securing funding and providing 
support for third sector organisations as their role became transformed in an 
increasingly neoliberal era. During this lengthy period of experience in policy 
making and delivery, he witnessed the onset of financialisaton and increased 
private sector involvement to deliver welfare reform. This contribution there-
fore draws on personal practical experience and an initial meta analysis of 
recent evaluations and assessments of more significant UK SIB programmes, 
shown in Table 1 below.  
These evaluation reports provide insights into problems arising during the 
setting up and delivery of SIBs, and seek to demystify claims made for SIB, 
including their use of evidence and innovation. This contribution also provides 
two appendices. Appendix 1 gives a political chronology for SIB develop-
ments, as discussed in Section 1. Appendix 2 provides a list of Government and 
other public funds dedicated to SIBs and social investment, which assists in a 
review of claims of government savings below, as discussed in Section 2. Both 
of these appendices are based on official sources, including the UK Govern-
ment’s Cabinet Office, whose third sector role is now transferred to the De-
partment of Culture Media and Sport.  
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Table 1: Evaluation Reports of UK SIBs  
SIBs EVALUATED BRIEF DESCRIPTION EVALUATION REPORTS 
Peterborough SIB 2009 to 
2016 
First Labour SIB. Aims to 
reduce recidivism 
(Demel 2012; McKay 2013) 
(Disley et al. 2015) 
SIBs funded by Department 
for Work and Pensions’ 
Innovation Fund: 3 year 
£30mn pilot from April 2012 
till November 2015 
10 SIBs and 100% Payment 
by Results (PbR) funding for 
projects targeted on young 
people aged 14 and over who 
were disadvantaged or at risk 
of disadvantage 
(Arena et al. 2016; Department 
of Work and Pensions 2014) 
Nine “Health and Care 
Trailblazers”  
Funding in 2013 by Depart-
ment of Health Social Enter-
prise Investment Fund  
Interim and Final Report by 
Policy Innovation Research Unit 
(Tan et al. 2015; Fraser et al. 
2018) 
Ongoing Evaluations of 
Social Outcomes and 
Commissioning Better 
Outcomes Funds (continuing 
series)  
Programmes of central 
Government and Big Lottery 
funding across different 
policy areas to provide 50% 
SIB project costs 
(Ecorys Research and Consulting
2016a, 2016b, 2017) 
Meta Evaluation of 46 
papers 
29 relate to PbR programmes, 
15 to SIBs and one PbR/SIB 
Policy Evaluation Research Unit 
(PERU) Review (Fox and O’Leary 
2017) 
Meta Evaluation of 32 SIBs 
in England and Wales 
between 2010 and 2015 and 
20 SIBs in the US  
Overview of outcome based 
models, including UK SIBs and 
US Pay for Success 
Policy Evaluation Research Unit 
(Albertson et al. 2018) 
(Sources in this table are based on the author’s own research).  
2.  The Myth of Bipartisanship and Parliamentary Control 
Many scholars argue that SIBs have a bipartisan appeal, because they are “ba-
sically supportive of governmental welfare-spending, but combine this with 
shifting risk to private investors and the marketisation of right wing politics” 
(Maier and Meyer 2017, 7). Initial promotion and the launch of the UK’s first 
SIB in Peterborough was a Labour initiative (Robinson et al. 2008; Disley et al. 
2015). Appendix 1 below shows clearly that policies for payment by results 
(PbR) and output measurement, on which SIBs and social investment are 
based, have all come from the left of British politics. They began with Ronald 
Cohen’s Social Investment Task Force (SITF), under Labour Chancellor Gor-
don Brown. From 2000 onwards, Cohen and others claimed that venture capital 
can “harness the most powerful forces of capitalism: entrepreneurship, innova-
tion and capital to tackle social issues more effectively” (Chiapello and Gode-
froy 2017, 178).  
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Alongside Cohen’s SITF Reports, (SITF 2000, 2003, 2005, 2010), SIBs 
were recommended from Brown’s Council on Social Action in 2007 (Robinson 
et al. 2008, 24). Among these Labour policies is an important but often ne-
glected report from David Freud to James Parnell, as Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions in 2007, advocating payment by results to private contrac-
tors. This advocacy of extending payment by results paved the way for SIBs in 
the UK (Freud 2007, 67).  
These policies for social investment and SIBs therefore came from the left 
of British politics at the highest level. Labour policies thus enabled Conserva-
tive Governments to expand SIB programmes described below without politi-
cal debate. Rather than bipartisanship, it is a lack of awareness and accountabil-
ity which has enabled expansion of Conservative Governments’ continuing 
subsidies for SIBs.  
This lack of public awareness was shown after Prime Minister May’s speech 
on mental health service reform in January 2017, when she referred to UK 
“global leadership on SIBs” with £50mn to support “those with mental health 
issues back into work” (May 2017). Though there is no UK SIB programme for 
mental health, no one challenged her statement. The nearest approximation is 
the Life Chances Fund (Cabinet Office 2016b). Mental health service users do 
not feature in the programme guidance (Cabinet Office 2016b, 3).  
There has been a similar lack of political awareness or interest in the publi-
cation of annual reports of the Government’s Reclaim Fund – into which pro-
ceeds from dormant bank accounts are transferred. After its 2017 report, 
£362mn was distributed to Big Lottery Fund, with £301mn passed on to Big 
Society Capital, the social investment wholesaler (Ainsworth 2018). A continu-
ing lack of public awareness enables the Government to use the dormant bank 
accounts of those now deceased, largely without Parliamentary questions or 
challenge, to provide subsidies for social investment and SIBs.  
The House of Lords Select Committee held a series of public hearings on 
charities between July and December 2016. Published minutes from these 
hearings show that three leading SIB players faced only minimal questions. 
Firstly, on Tuesday, 25 October 2016, the Chief Executive of Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundation, one of the UK’s largest independent foundations, referred to “an 
unspoken expectation that philanthropic capital will come in to take that risk on 
the outsourcing of public services,” and continued, “we do not feel that under-
writing statutory risks and costs or private sector risks and costs is a particular-
ly good use of philanthropic capital” (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Charities 2016a). 
Despite her previous experience with Big Society Capital, she was not asked 
any questions. Secondly, the Chief Executive of the influential intermediary 
Social Finance Ltd, which in August 2009 published the first UK SIB imple-
mentation guidance (Social Finance 2009) and in April 2010 set up the Peter-
borough SIB, spoke about the difficulties of smaller third sector organisations 
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in accessing social investment. “The sub £150,000 marketplace needs subsidy 
[…] the valley of death of investment is £50,000 up to £250,000 for normal 
commercial businesses” (House of Lords Select Committee on Charities 
2016a). Despite this, he was not questioned by Committee Members. Thirdly, 
on Tuesday, 29 November 2016, the Chief Executive of Big Lottery, with 
administers substantial funds for SIB support, was not asked questions on SIBs 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Charities 2016b). 
Finally, after six months of its published oral and written evidence, the Se-
lect Committee’s Report in March 2017 reflected its lack of questioning. The 
strongest criticism in the Report was that expectations placed upon SIBs had 
yet to materialise and that the Government’s focus on them was disproportion-
ate to their potential impact. The Committee concluded that future public fund-
ing should be reoriented from SIBs “towards financial products with applica-
tion to a wider range of charities and beneficiaries” (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Charities 2017, 86). After ten years for SIBs in a political wil-
derness, this Committee asked less than searching questions about promises of 
SIB savings, innovation, methodological rigour, and transparency. 
3.  The Myth of a SIB Market and Government Savings 
SIB proponents continue to promote the myth of a growing SIB market for 
investors, when Government savings are needed. For example, the National 
Audit Office “estimates a 37% real-term reduction in government funding to 
local authorities between 2010/2011-2015/2016” (Hoare et al. 2016, 8). But 
despite promises of private funding, SIBs from their inception were fed by 
Government and Lottery funding. Far from producing savings, SIBs necessitate 
high public sector subsidies.  
Appendix 2 shows that all major Government Departments, including HM 
Treasury and Cabinet Office, have contributed to ongoing SIB support and 
subsidies. From 2002 to 2017, Big Lottery and Government Departments, 
including HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office, contributed a total of 
£1,062,720,000 to SIB and social investment subsidies (Floyd et al. 2017, 22). 
Every £1 of SIB investment is supported by at least £1.15 of government mon-
ey (Floyd 2017, 21). Early evaluations of SIB support programmes in Table 1 
confirm central Government funding for around 50% of SIBs’ total project 
costs (Ecorys Research and Consulting 2016a, 2016b, 2017).  
Many evaluation reports confirm that there are few savings. “Ways to Well-
ness,” an early UK health care SIB, promoted by Newcastle Gateshead Clinical 
Commissioning Group (CCG), uses social prescribing to improve long term 
health outcomes (Ronicle et al. 2014): “The total expected outcomes payments 
made to Ways to Wellness in its first six years of operation are £8.2mn, of 
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which £5.2mn (64%) will be paid by the CCG, £2mn (24%) by Commissioning 
Better Outcomes (CBO) and £1mn (12%) by Social Outcomes Fund (SOF).”  
A further independent review by North East Quality Observatory Services 
indicated net savings to Newcastle West CCG of between £2mn and £7mn 
(Newcastle Clinical Commissioning Group 2017). But this is less than the SIB 
programme’s estimated total cost of £12.85mn (Fraser et al. 2018, 59). 
Similarly, the Final Evaluations of nine “Trailblazer” healthcare SIBS con-
firmed a need for subsidy. Only one Trailblazer reported having made cashable 
savings from SIB-financed interventions (Fraser et al. 2018, 1). Some local 
commissioners may view SIBs favourably because evaluations show that many 
outcome payments are not paid by them but instead by central government and 
Big Lottery (Fraser et al. 2018, 142). Despite this, the Final Trailblazer Evalua-
tion concludes that in the absence of financial savings, in four out of five Trail-
blazers, successful achievement of outcomes may come at increased cost to 
local commissioners, at least in the short to medium term (Fraser et al. 2018, 
13).  
These evaluations demonstrate that local authority and NHS commissioners 
view SIBs as simply another Government funding programme, with the added 
inducement of Government funding for feasibility studies to prepare for SIBs, 
usually funded as precursors or trailblazers to funding programmes in Appen-
dix 2. 
Though these examples show that savings from SIBs are small, their calcu-
lations systematically excludes transaction costs. Despite a series of Freedom 
of Information requests by the author, it is very difficult to trace the cost of 
promotional activities, evaluation reports, contract negotiation, policy entrepre-
neurs, and legal and economic consultants involved in SIB construction.  
Additionally, the public sector costs, especially time and resources, are hid-
den. Firstly, many in academia provide regular updates and blogs to enhance 
their reputation as evaluators and intermediaries. “Since 2011, the GPL (Har-
vard Government Performance Lab) has provided pro bono government-side 
technical assistance on 84 projects, supporting leaders of 61 jurisdictions in 28 
states” (Harvard Kennedy School of Government 2018). A UK policy commu-
nity is emerging, which includes Newcastle University Business School, Lon-
don Universities’ Policy Innovation Research Unit (PIRU), and Manchester 
Metropolitan University’s Policy Evaluation Research Unit (PERU), providing 
evaluation and intermediation and business models for more SIBs.  
Secondly, in support of higher education and public service bodies, SIB ser-
vice providers and intermediaries continue to promote SIBs (Albertson et al. 
2018, 17). Social Finance, a prominent social investment financial intermedi-
ary, which set up the Peterborough SIB in 2009, is now active in the UK and 
US (Social Finance 2017). 
Despite few publicly available figures for expenses incurred in structuring 
and managing SIBs, contractors, intermediaries, advisors, and independent 
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assessors, including for impact measurement, must all be paid. Giacomantonio 
argues that “it is unreasonable to believe that the addition of so many extra 
actors – including investors and intermediaries alongside commissioners and 
service providers – into a service contracting situation can result in lower trans-
action costs, and empirical findings to date bear this out” (Giacomantonio 
2017, 59). These payments are not disclosed since most SIB negotiations for 
transaction costs are commercially confidential. Most intermediaries are not 
just impartial brokers and assessors of the SIB. They are also interested in 
making the SIB a success to keep them in business (Maier and Meyer 2017, 5).  
It is thus not unreasonable to conclude that any small and difficult savings 
from SIBs might not be outweighed by additional but undocumented SIB 
transaction costs. This raises the issue of whether extensive resources to fund 
SIBs would be better spent on improving other commissioning approaches 
(Disley et al. 2015, 10).  
4.  The Myths of Evidence-Based Policy and Transfer of Risk 
A third major claim made frequently for SIBs is that they exemplify evidence-
based policy, with programmes soundly evaluated. The argument continues 
that any risk of failure will be assumed by private funders, so that commission-
ers make payments and investors receive rewards only if a SIB is successful.  
After ten years of UK SIBs, most still rely on performance management in-
formation, rather than independent analysis or other accepted methods, to 
demonstrate the achievement of outputs. SIBs are rarely compared with exist-
ing service approaches with proven track records of financial accomplishment. 
In all but one of UK SIBs that have paid out to date, payment was based on 
performance targets, rather than counter factual impact evaluation, with little or 
no mention of wider social outcomes linked to outcomes-based commissioning 
(Fox and Morris 2019, 5, 6). It is not clear whether different approaches will 
actually deliver results in combination (Joy and Shields 2013, 47). The inde-
pendently funded Oxford Outcomes Lab has suggested that evaluations rarely 
explicitly or rigorously compare a SIB commissioning approach with a grant, 
fee-for-service, or even in-house delivery for a given population (Blavatnik 
School of Government 2019). 
There is considerable difficulty finding causal evidence for SIBs. The Final 
Trailblazers’ Evaluation covering nine health and care SIBs showed that three 
out of four sites implicitly assumed that the SIB was responsible for outcomes, 
while in the other, “a pragmatic decision was taken to pay the provider as 
through the full outcomes target had been met” through difficulties in identify-
ing appropriate data (Fraser et al. 2018, 100).  
A comprehensive Brookings Institute report on the first five years of SIB 
experience worldwide (Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015, 20) 
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shows almost 30% of SIB evaluations based on Validated Administrative Data 
on special education, placement in care (residential or foster care), employment 
status, and incarceration, rather than Historical Comparisons, Quasi Experi-
mental methods, or Randomised Control Trials. The PERU Evaluation Review 
includes perhaps the most pragmatic UK evaluation – of the Bridges Fund 
Management’s “It’s All About Me” Adoption SIB. Without any impact evalua-
tion, the Cabinet Office simply stated that no children would have found a 
home without the SIB and that deadweight or displacement was nil (Albertson 
et al. 2018, 104). Many evaluations are published by UK government depart-
ments that commissioned them (ICF Consulting Services 2019). Robust coun-
terfactual groups are hard to find and not prevalent in approaches to evaluating 
or measuring outcomes (DWP 2014; Tan et al. 2015). Evaluations frequently 
rely on existing administrative data sets and often report challenges either in 
accessing data or about the poor quality of data (Fox and O’Leary 2017, 6).  
Despite claims of methodological rigour, the Policy Innovation Research 
Unit review (Albertson et al. 2018, 49-56; 72-5) found that much literature was 
either an analysis of the general SIB concept (e.g., Mulgan 2010, Fox and 
Albertson 2012) or literature reviews, sometimes combined with small-scale 
surveys of stakeholders (e.g., Jackson 2013, Ronicle et al. 2014). Tan et al. 
(2015, 5) searched databases but found little empirical data about SIBs, despite 
a larger academic, policy, and “grey” literature about theoretical impacts of 
SIB funding for providing public services (Fox, Albertson, and O’Leary 2017, 
12).  
SIB proponents also claim that SIBs transfer risk from the public sector to 
intermediaries and private investors. But little actual risk transfer takes place. 
Despite extensive subsidies, most external private investment has come from 
trusts and foundations persuaded by Government, rather than from high net 
worth private investors’ taking risks. CAF Venturesome has made investments 
of more than £40mn in 500 charities and social enterprises. Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundation, the UK’s largest trust, invested £45mn in 120 investments (Floyd, 
Davis, and Merryfield 2017). The Trailblazer Final Evaluation found little 
evidence that the opportunity to invest was seen by commercially minded pri-
vate investors as offering a sufficiently attractive new investment opportunity 
(Fraser et al. 2018, 134).  
In several cases, transfer of risk simply does not take place because different 
mechanisms are inserted to protect investments through public guarantees, 
subsidies, or philanthropy (Arena et al. 2016, 930). Similarly, the UK National 
Audit Office found little evidence of payment by results risk transfer (National 
Audit Office 2015). The Policy Innovation Research Unit review concluded 
that it is by no means clear that the UK Government’s PbR approach has re-
sulted in cost and risk reduction (Albertson et al. 2018, 111). 
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5.  The Myth of Innovation 
Many SIB promoters hail their potential for innovation in service design, as a 
new type of intervention to solve social problems. But in many cases, there is 
significant deviation from SIBs initial promises, so that innovation is mini-
mised. 
Neither PbR nor SIB programmes in the UK have been strongly associated 
with innovation in service design. The Peterborough SIB was a prime example. 
Apart from using a SIB mechanism, any innovation was not necessarily a result 
of SIB funding, as non-SIB funded initiatives showed similar characteristics 
(Disley et al. 2015, 8). In Rikers Island, the claimed innovative model was the 
Adolescent Behavioural Learning Experience (ABLE), “a cognitive behaviour-
al therapy proven to reduce recidivism” (Warner 2013, 312). But the VERA 
Institute of Justice Adolescent Behaviour Learning Experience Impact Evalua-
tion of Rikers showed that it made little impact on reoffending (Parsons, Weiss, 
and Wei 2016).  
Instead of innovating, many SIBs amplify existing interventions. Providers 
are tempted to replicate existing interventions, rather than innovation (Albert-
son et al. 2018, 27). SIBs typically focus on scaling up or extending the reach 
of existing evidence-based programmes, and provide support for evidence-
based policy and practice, rather than deliver any innovation (Albertson et al. 
2018, 107). Some interventions are relatively conventional in approach and/or 
are similar to non SIB programmes (Fox, Albertson, and O’Leary 2017, 7).  
Furthermore, as shown above, SIBs are not innovative on account of their 
financing, since considerable evidence shows that their financiers and investors 
are risk averse (Bafford 2012, 13; Godeke 2013, 73; Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation 2016, 16, 21).  
Finally, in a context of reduced public spending, some third sector organisa-
tions claim that SIBs offer greater financial stability to non-profit and voluntary 
sector organizations delivering these services (Leventhal 2012; Jackson 2013; 
Social Enterprise UK 2013; Clark et al. 2014). But evaluations show that many 
small-scale third sector organisations may be discouraged, or intimidated, from 
taking part in a SIB for a number of reasons, particularly the large-scale nature 
of SIBs and the implications of an outcomes-focus and pressurise to deliver 
outcomes (Fraser et al. 2018, 36).  
Finally, as shown above, many SIBs rely on existing metrics and methods. 
This means that in practice, SIBs diverge from a SIB prototype by avoiding 
elements beyond the traditional logic of public procurement for reengineering, 
and thus increasing the efficiency, of the public expenditure supply chain (Are-
na et al. 2016, 934). 
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6.  Conclusion 
Through evaluations and assessments above, this contribution has sought to 
show that caution is needed in responding to claims made for SIBs. Section 1 
shows that instead of SIBs’ representing a bipartisan approach, progress under 
Labour and Coalition Governments has largely been assisted through lack of 
public awareness and lack of Parliamentary accountability. Sections 2 and 3 
show that data in Government and independent reports does not allow us to 
answer the question of whether SIBs are likely to be superior to other ap-
proaches to commissioning (Fraser et al. 2018, 141).  
All sections above show that there is little evidence to support claims made 
by SIB advocates. SIB evaluations and analyses in sections 2 and 3 demon-
strate that it is questionable whether SIBs are more effective or efficient than 
other funding regimes. In an initial literature review, which preceded their 
Final Trailblazer evaluation in Table 1 and section 3, Fraser et al. conclude that 
there is  
very little rigorous counterfactual comparison of SIBs versus alternative 
methods of finance to deliver the same service to the same type of users, and 
thus a lack of evidence of costs and benefits compared with the alternative ap-
proach to procurement […] the lack of quantitative data and evidenced casha-
ble savings is worrying. (Fraser et al. 2016, 13)  
Focus on measurement raises significant questions about attribution of out-
comes to the actions of providers and financiers and how any “SIB effect” can 
adequately be interpreted and validated (Fraser et al. 2016, 13).  
Finally, as in section 2, the role of SIB promoters as policy entrepreneurs is 
largely overlooked, with questions on whether transaction, governance, and 
evaluation costs outweigh efficiency gains and how real innovation can be 
fostered without risking viability of smaller deliverers and providers. The au-
thor concurs with the conclusion of Fox et al. that the potential of a SIB/PbR 
approach may not be as an innovative form of commissioning, but rather as an 
innovative form of enabling (Fox et al. 2017, 19). 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Chronology of UK SIB Developments with Political Origins 
From 2000 till 2010, the following initiatives were all from Labour Governments or 
Labour supporting organisations, except for 2003 Bank of England Report:  
April 2000 – Creation of ‘Social Investment Task Force’ (SITF). Labour Chancellor 
sets up Task Force (SITF) under venture capitalist Ronald Cohen, as first steps 
towards private investment in public services. “To set out how entrepreneurial 
practices can be applied to obtain higher social and financial returns from social 
investment” (SITF 2000, 3). 
October 2000 – SITF Report “Enterprising Communities: Wealth Beyond Welfare: 
First Report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer from Social Investment Task 
Force” Recommends Community Development Venture Funds, Tax Credit, and 
Support for Community Development.  
November 2000 HM Treasury Pre Budget Report. First mention of tax incentive for 
community investment – a “Community Investment Tax Credit” (Chancellor of 
Exchequer 2000, para. 3.70). 
2002 Peter Lloyd (University of Liverpool) Report to Social Enterprise Coalition. A 
significant external academic report, which Includes commissioning and contract-
ing within a framework which still broadly in place (Lloyd 2002). 
March 2003. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) consultation document “En-
terprise for Communities” and “Working Paper: Finance for CICs” and Proposals 
for a Community Interest Company (CIC). CICs represent an additional “layer” for 
private Companies Limited by Shares and Companies Limited by Guarantee and 
others. This move to individually owned structures formed a basis for organisations 
which later deliver social investment and SIBs.  
May 2003 The Financing of Social Enterprises: Special Report by Bank of England. 
“Problems in obtaining external finance were cited more often by social enterprises 
as a major barrier to expanding trading activity than any other barrier” (Bank of 
England 2003, 29). This was a forerunner to loans. 
July 2003. SITF 2003 Update “Enterprising Communities: Wealth Beyond Wel-
fare” (SITF 2003). Update from 2000 recommendations on Community Investment 
Task Credit, Community Development Venture Funds, etc.  
December 2003. Futurebuilders Fund Created (see Appendix 2). Consortium of 
Charity Bank, Unity Trust Bank, National Council for Voluntary Organisations and 
Northern Rock Foundation wins HM Treasury contract to deliver Futurebuilders. 
First major £215mn investment fund for social enterprise loans and equity (National 
Audit Office 2009, 5).  
July 2005. SITF 2005 Update “Enterprising Communities: Wealth Beyond Wel-
fare” (SITF 2005). Further updates on developments recommenced in 2003 Report 
above. 
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January 2006. Department of Health creates internal Social Enterprise Unit. “So-
cial Enterprises are business-like entrepreneurial organisations with primarily social 
objectives” (Department of Health Social Enterprise Unit 2007, 4). Unit for out-
sourcing laid foundations for social investment and SIBs.  
2006. Social Enterprise Unit functions move to Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs). Social Enterprise Action Plan “Scaling New Heights” transfers social 
enterprise policy to RDAs, with further £0.5mn support, thus mainstreaming third 
sector outsourcing of public service delivery. 
February 2007. David Freud Report “Reducing Dependency, Increasing Oppor-
tunity: Options for the Future of Welfare to Work.” Though an independent report 
to Labour Secretary for Work and Pensions, Freud later became Conservative Gov-
ernment Minister. Significant extension of payment by results, which forms basis 
for outsourced welfare programmes, later using SIBs.  
2007. Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF) established by the Department of 
Health. £100mn in three phases over four-years to support development of social 
enterprises in health and social care services (see Appendix 2). SEIF later used to 
support nine Health and Care Trailblazers.  
2007. Council on Social Action, convened by Gordon Brown, Labour Chancellor. 
First Government mention of SIBs. “(S)ocial investors could be persuaded to take 
on implementation risk (the risk that given interventions will genuinely improve 
social outcomes) that has previously been borne by government” (Robinson et al. 
2008, 24). 
2007. Foundation of Social Finance Ltd, Ronald Cohen as Chair. Later sets up 
Labour’s first SIB in Peterborough 2009. 
November 2008. Labour Government’s Dormant Bank Accounts Act. Leads to 2012 
Conservative Government tasking Big Society Capital to manage £600mn from 
dormant bank accounts and “Merlin Banks,” later to become a “social investment 
wholesaler” to fund SIBs (see Appendix 2). 
2009. “Social Impact Bonds: Rethinking Finance for Social Outcomes.” Highly 
influential Social Finance policy document, supporting Labour Government, pro-
moting SIB arguments still in current use. (Social Finance set up Labour’s first SIB 
in Peterborough). “Potential Social Impact Bond applications” foreshadowed policy 
areas where SIBs feature today (Social Finance 2009, 5). 
December 2009. Labour Government White Paper “Putting the Frontline First.” 
First mention of SIBs in any Government White Paper “actively developing a pilot 
to use Social Impact Bonds to draw in new investment into third sector service 
provision” (HM Government and Byrne 2009, 32). 
April 2010. Peterborough SIB. Labour Government. Widely trailed first actual UK 
SIB. £11.25mn grant from Big Lottery to Social Finance as intermediary, with 
significant support from other organisations.  
April 2010. Final Report of Social Investment Task Force. SIBs “developed to 
address these issues by enabling significant private investment in preventative 
interventions through social sector organisations” (SITF 2010, 18).  
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From 2010 till 2017, the following initiatives from Coalition or Conservative Gov-
ernments used Labour’s original structures. Also shows national third sector organi-
sations, which had supported Labour initiatives, continuing to support those from 
Conservatives.  
February 2011. Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition White Paper, 
“Growing the Social Investment Market.” Used many similar arguments from SITF 
Final Report and “Putting the Frontline First” 2009 Labour White Paper, including 
SIBs (Cabinet Office and HM Government 2011, 30). 
April 2012. Big Society Capital begins operations as social investment wholesale 
agent. Based on 2008 Labour Dormant Bank Accounts Act “Big Society Capital 
will grow the social investment market which blends financial return with positive 
social impact” (Cabinet Office 2012).  
2013. Department of Health promotes SIBs in 9 sites. “SIB Trailblazers in Health 
and Social Care.” Labelled “SIB Trailblazers” above (Fraser et al. 2016, 2018).  
June 2013. Social Economy Alliance launch at “Social Economy Summit” to influ-
ence Local Government and European Elections and 2015 UK General Election. 
Formed by Social Enterprise UK (main UK social enterprise organisation) and wide 
range of third sector organisations. Demonstrates accommodation of national third 
sector organisations within Coalition and Conservative Government policies.  
2013 till 2017. Series of SIB Funds and Conservative Government and Big Lottery 
Support Funds (see Appendix 2). Funding SIB feasibility studies, infrastructure 
costs, and payments to investors.  
May 2017 General Election. “Social Economy Alliance Manifesto for an Inclusive 
Economy” continued to support Government policies above for outsourcing to 
private and third sector organisations (Social Economy Alliance 2017, 4). 
March 2017. Dormant Assets Commission. Arising from 2008 Labour Dormant 
Bank Accounts Act, Commission reports to Conservative Government on a further 
potential £2bn from dormant charity and other unclaimed assets, which may be 
“earmarked for good causes.” This significant extension for potential use of un-
claimed assets to support Government target of £1bn of SIBs by the end of this 
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